Foreign and Military Policy
- Introduction
- Effects of the September 11 attacks
- Public consciousness about international terrorism
- Outbursts of patriotism
- Confidence in government
- Emergence of important fundamental questions
- How to wage a "war" against terrorism?
- How to hold other nations accountable?
- How to act when other nations fight terrorism?
- Does such a war require military to be redesigned?
- Reemergence of classic questions
- Do we only support nations that are reasonably free and democratic?
- Are we the world's policemen?
- Democratic politics and foreign and military policy
- Tocqueville and weakness of democracy
- Others blame reckless policies of presidents
- Effects of the September 11 attacks
- Kinds of foreign policy
- Majoritarian politics
- Perceived to confer widespread benefits, impose widespread costs
- Examples
- War
- Military alliances
- Nuclear test ban or strategic arms limitation treaties
- Response to Berlin blockade by Soviets
- Cuban missile crisis
- Covert CIA operations
- Diplomatic recognition of People's Republic of China
- Interest group politics
- Identifiable groups pitted against one another for costs, benefits
- Examples
- Cyprus policy: Greeks versus Turks
- Tariffs: Japanese versus steel
- Client politics
- Benefits to identifiable group, without apparent costs to any distinct group
- Example: Israel policy (transformation to interest group politics?)
- Who has power?
- Majoritarian politics: president dominates; public opinion supports but does not guide
- Interest group or client politics: larger congressional role
- Entrepreneurial politics: Congress the central political arena
- Majoritarian politics
- The constitutional and legal context
- The Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle"
- President commander in chief but Congress appropriates money
- President appoints ambassadors, but Senate confirms
- President negotiates treaties, but Senate ratifies
- But Americans think president in charge, which history confirms
- Presidential box score
- Presidents relatively strong in foreign affairs
- More successes in Congress on foreign than on domestic affairs
- Unilateral commitments of troops upheld but stronger than Framers intended
- 1801: Jefferson sends navy to Barbary
- 1845: Polk sends troops to Mexico
- 1861: Lincoln blockades Southern ports
- 1940: FDR sends destroyers to Britain
- 1950: Truman sends troops to Korea
- 1960s: Kennedy and Johnson send forces to Vietnam
- 1983: Reagan sends troops to Grenada
- 1989: Bush orders invasion of Panama
- 1990: Bush sends forces into Kuwait
- 1999: Clinton orders bombing of Serbian forces
- 2000: Bush sends troops to Afghanistan
- Presidents comparatively weak in foreign affairs; other heads of state find U.S. presidents unable to act
- Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt unable to ally with Great Britain before World War I and World War II
- Wilson unable to lead U.S. into the League of Nations
- Reagan criticized on commitments to El Salvador and Lebanon
- Bush debated Congress on declaration of Gulf War
- Presidents relatively strong in foreign affairs
- Evaluating the power of the president
- Depends on one's agreement/disagreement with policies
- Supreme Court gives federal government wide powers; reluctant to intervene in Congress-president disputes
- Nixon's enlarging of Vietnam war
- Lincoln's illegal measures during Civil War
- Carter's handling of Iranian assets
- Franklin Roosevelt's "relocation" of 100,000 Japanese-Americans
- Checks on presidential power: political rather than constitutional
- Congress: control of purse strings
- Limitations on the president's ability to give military or economic aid to other countries
- Arms sales to Turkey
- Blockage of intervention in Angola
- Legislative veto (previously) on large sale of arms
- War Powers Act of 1973
- Provisions
- Only sixty-day commitment of troops without declaration of war
- All commitments reported within forty-eight hours
- Legislative veto (previously) to bring troops home
- Observance
- no president has acknowledged constitutionality
- Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton sent troops without explicit congressional authorization
- Supreme Court action (Chadha case)
- Struck down the legislative veto
- Other provisos to be tested
- Effect of act doubtful even if upheld
- Brief conflicts not likely to be affected; Congress has not challenged a successful operation
- Even extended hostilities continue: Vietnam and Lebanon
- Provisions
- Intelligence oversight
- Only two committees today, not the previous eight
- No authority to disapprove covert action
- But "covert" actions less secret after congressional debate
- Congress sometimes blocks covert action: Boland Amendment
- Congressional concern about CIA after attacks of September 11
- The Constitution creates an "invitation to struggle"
- The machinery of foreign policy
- Consequences of major power status
- President more involved in foreign affairs
- More agencies shape foreign policy
- Numerous agencies not really coordinated by anyone
- Secretary of State unable to coordinate
- Job too big for one person
- Most agencies owe no political or bureaucratic loyalty
- National Security Council created to coordinate
- Chaired by president and includes vice president, secretaries of State and Defense, director of CIA, chair of joint chiefs
- National security adviser heads staff
- Goal of staff is balanced view
- Grown in influence since Kennedy but downgraded by Reagan
- NSC rivals secretary of state
- Consequences of multicentered decision-making machinery
- "It's never over" because of rivalries within and between branches
- Agency positions influenced by agency interests
- Consequences of major power status
- Foreign policy and public opinion
- Outlines of foreign policy shaped by public and elite opinion
- Before World War II, public opposed U.S. involvement
- World War II shifted popular opinion because
- Universally popular war
- War successful
- United States emerged as world's dominant power
- Support for active involvement persisted until Vietnam
- Yet support for internationalism highly general
- Public opinion now mushy and volatile
- Backing the president
- Public's tendency to support president in crises
- Foreign crises increases presidential level of public approval
- Strong support to rally 'round the flag for some but not all foreign military crises
- Presidential support does not decrease with casualties
- Americans support escalation rather than withdrawal in a conflict
- Public's tendency to support president in crises
- Mass versus elite opinion
- Mass opinion
- Generally poorly informed
- Generally supportive of president
- Conservative, less internationalist
- Elite opinion
- Better informed
- Opinions change more rapidly (Vietnam)
- Protest on moral or philosophical grounds
- More liberal and internationalist
- Mass opinion
- Outlines of foreign policy shaped by public and elite opinion
- Cleavages among foreign policy elites
- Foreign policy elite divided
- How a worldview shapes foreign policy
- Definition of worldview: comprehensive mental picture of world issues facing the United States and ways of responding
- Example: Mr. X article on containment of USSR
- Not unanimously accepted but consistent with public's mood, events, and experience
- Four worldviews
- Isolation paradigm
- Opposes involvement in European wars
- Adopted after World War I because war accomplished little
- Appeasement (containment) paradigm
- Reaction to appeasement of Hitler in Munich
- Pearl Harbor ended isolationism in United States
- Postwar policy to resist Soviet expansionism
- Disengagement ("Vietnam") paradigm
- Reaction to military defeat and political disaster of Vietnam
- Crisis interpreted in three ways
- Correct worldview but failed to try hard enough
- Correct worldview but applied in wrong place
- Worldview itself wrong
- Critics believed worldview wrong and new one based on new isolationism needed
- Elites with disengagement view in Carter administration but were replaced during Reagan and Bush administrations
- Human rights
- Clinton had a disinterest in foreign policy and his advisors believed in disengagement.
- Clinton's strongest congressional supporters argued against the Gulf War but advocated military intervention in Kosovo.
- Change in view explained by concern for human rights and belief that situation in Kosovo amounted to genocide
- Conservatives who supported containment in Gulf War urged disengagement in Kosovo
- The politics of coalition building
- Should the United States act "alone?"
- If so, in what circumstances?
- Isolation paradigm
- The Use of Military Force
- Military power more important after collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War
- Military force used to attack Iraq, defend Kosovo, maintain order in Bosnia, and occupy Haiti and Somalia
- Several nations have long-range rockets and weapons of destruction
- Many nations feel threatened by neighbors
- Russia still has nuclear weapons
- Majoritarian view of military
- Almost all Americans benefit, almost all pay
- President is the commander-in-chief
- Congress plays largely a supportive role
- Client view of military
- Real beneficiaries of military spending--general, admirals, big corporations, members of Congress whose districts get fat defense contracts--but everyone pays
- Military-industrial complex shapes what is spent
- Military power more important after collapse of Soviet Union and end of Cold War
- The defense budget
- Total spending
- Small peacetime military until 1950
- No disarmament after Korea because of Soviet threat
- Military system designed to repel Soviet invasion of Europe and small-scale invasions
- Public opinion supports a large military
- Demise of USSR produced debate
- Liberals: sharp defense cuts; United States should not serve as world's police officer
- Conservatives: some cuts but retain well-funded military because world still dangerous
- Desert Storm and Kosovo campaigns made clear no escaping U.S. need to use military force
- Kosovo campaign indicated that military had been reduced too much
- Clinton and Republican Congress called for more military spending
- Small peacetime military until 1950
- Total spending
- What do we buy with our money?
- Changing circumstances make justification of expenditures complex
- World War II and Cold War: big armies, artillery, tanks, ships, etc.
- War on Terrorism: small groups, special forces, high-tech communications, precision guided bombs, and rockets
- Joint operations now also seem more necessary
- Secretary of defense
- Must transform conventional military for wars on terrorism
- Must budget in an atmosphere of debate and pressure from members of both the military and Congress
- Debating big new weapons
- Washington folks are used to it (B-1, B-2 bombers, MX missiles, M1 tank, etc.)
- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or "Star Wars") debate particularly protracted
- Major scientific and philosophical quarrels
- Reluctance among the military
- Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) requires more missiles and bombers
- SDI may reduce spending on missiles and bombers
- Concern MAD only works against rational leaders
- Changing circumstances make justification of expenditures complex
- What do we get for our money?
- Personnel
- From draft to all-volunteer force in 1973
- Volunteer force improved as result of:
- Increases in military pay
- Rising civilian unemployment
- Changes in military
- More women in military
- Ban of women on combat ships lifted in 1993 but Congress to be consulted if ground combat involved
- "Don't ask, don't tell" compromise adopted by Clinton on homosexuals in military
- Big-ticket hardware
- Main reasons for cost overruns
- Unpredictability of cost of new items
- Contractor incentives to underestimate at first
- Military chiefs want best weapons money can buy
- "Sole sourcing" of weapons without competitive bids
- Holding down budget by "stretching out" production
- Latter four factors can be controlled; first cannot
- Main reasons for cost overruns
- Small-ticket items
- Seemingly outrageous prices come from allocation of overhead, small run of items produced
- Others result from "gold-plating" phenomenon
- Readiness, favorite area for short-term budget cutting
- Other cuts would hurt constituents
- Cuts here show up quickly in money saved
- Bases
- At one time, a lot of bases opened and few closed
- Commission on Base Realignment and Closure created to take client politics out of base closings
- Personnel
- Structure of defense decision-making
- National Security Act of 1947
- Department of Defense
- Secretary of Defense (civilian, as are secretaries of the army, navy, and air force)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (military)
- Reasons for separate uniformed services
- Fear that unified military will become too powerful
- Desire of services to preserve their autonomy
- Interservice rivalries intended by Congress to receive maximum information
- Department of Defense
- 1986 defense reorganization plan
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Composed of uniformed head of each service with a chair and vice chair appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate
- Chair since 1986 principal military adviser to president
- Joint Staff
- Officers from each service assisting JCS
- Since 1986 serves chair; promoted at same rate
- The services
- Each service headed by a civilian secretary responsible for purchasing and public affairs
- Senior military officer oversees discipline and training
- The chain of command
- Chair of JCS does not have combat command
- Uncertainty whether 1986 changes will work
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- National Security Act of 1947